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Abstract—The Alternating Step(r, s) Generator, ASG(r, s), is
a clock-controlled sequence generator which is recently proposed
by A. Kanso. It consists of three registers of length l, m and n bits.
The first register controls the clocking of the two others. The two
other registers are clocked r times (or not clocked) (resp. s times
or not clocked) depending on the clock-control bit in the first
register. The special case r = s = 1 is the original and well known
Alternating Step Generator. Kanso claims there is no efficient
attack against the ASG(r, s) since r and s are kept secret. In this
paper, we present an Alternating Step Generator, ASG, model for
the ASG(r, s) and also we present a new and efficient algebraic
attack on ASG(r, s) using 3(m+ n) bits of the output sequence
to find the secret key with O((m2+n2)2l+1+m32m−1+n32n−1)
computational complexity. We show that this system is no more
secure than the original ASG, in contrast to the claim of the
ASG(r, s)’s constructor.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal in stream cipher design is to efficiently produce
pseudorandom sequences which should be indistinguishable
from truly random sequences. From a cryptanalysis point of
view, a good stream cipher should be resistant against a known-
plaintext attack. In this kind of attack, the cryptanalyst is given
a plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext, and the task is
to determine the secret key. For a synchronous stream cipher,
this is equivalent to the problem of finding the secret key or
initial state that produced a given keystream output.
In stream cipher design, one usually uses Linear Feedback
Shift Registers, LFSRs, as building block in different ways,
and the secret key is often used as the initial state of the
LFSRs. A general methodology for producing random-like
sequences from LFSRs that has been popular is using the
output of one or more LFSRs to control the clock of other
LFSRs. The purpose is to destroy the linearity of the LFSR
sequences and hence provide the resulting sequence with
a large linear complexity. This structure is called a Clock-
Controlled Generator which has several different types, e.g.,
Stop/Go Generator [2], [3], Step1/Step2 Generator [3], Shrink-
ing Generator [4], Self-Shrinking Generator [5], and Jump
Register which is proposed recently in [6]–[8] and it is used
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in some candidates to the European ECRYPT/eSTREAM [9]
project, e.g., Pomaranch [10] and Mickey [11].
An Alternating Step Generator (ASG), a well-known stream
cipher proposed in [12], consists of a regularly clocked binary
LFSR, A, and two Stop/Go clocked binary LFSRs, B and C. At
each time, the clock-control bit from A determines which one
of the two Stop/Go LFSRs is clocked, and the output sequence
is obtained as bit-wise sum of the two Stop/Go clocked LFSR
sequences.
ASG(r, s) proposed in [1] is a general form of an original
ASG which will be described in the next section. The differ-
ence is that B and C are shifted r and s times, respectively,
where r and s are part of the secret key. As far as we know,
there is presently no efficient general attack on this algorithm.
In this paper, we propose an algebraic attack on this algorithm
and we will show that its security is no more than the security
of the original ASG, in contrast to the constructor’s claim.
In Section II, a brief description of the ASG(r, s) will be
presented and in Section III, the security of the ASG(r, s) is
investigated from the author’s point of view. We model the
ASG(r, s) to an original ASG in Section IV and according
to this model, we will present our attack in Section V and
conclude in Section VI.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASG(r, s)
The Alternating Step(r, s) Generator, ASG(r, s), is a clock-
controlled based stream cipher and it is similar to the original
ASG but the clock-controlled LFSR B and C jump r and s
steps respectively instead of in a Stop/Go manner.
ASG(r, s) is composed of a regularly clocked FSR, A, and
two clock-controlled FSR’s, B and C. At each time, the clock-
control bit from A, e.g., 0th cell, determines which of the two
FSR’s is clocked. B is clocked by the constant integer r and
C is not clocked if the content of the 0th cell of A is ‘1’,
otherwise, B is not clocked and C is clocked by the constant
integer s. FSR A is called the Control Register and FSRs B
and C are called the Generating Registers. The output bits of
the ASG(r, s) are produced by adding modulo 2 the output
bits of FSRs B and C under the control of FSR A. Kanso has
recommended using a FSR A with a de-Bruijn output sequence
of span l [14] and Primitive Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) for generating registers B and C with length m and n
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Fig. 1. The Alternating Step(r, s) Generator, ASG(r, s)
bits respectively which is illustrated in fig. 1. He proved that
when the values of m and n are satisfying gcd(m,n) = 1, and
the values of r and s are satisfying gcd(r, 2m − 1) = 1 and
gcd(s, 2n−1) = 1, then the period of the output sequences is
equal to 2l(2m− 1)(2n− 1) and the linear complexity (Ll) of
the output sequence satisfies (m+n)2l−1 < Ll ≤ (m+n)2l.
The initial states of registers and the number of jumps, r and
s, are the secret key. This structure is considered in the whole
paper and in our attack.
III. SECURITY OF THE ASG(r, s)
Kanso claims in [1] that his structure, ASG(r, s), is secure
against all known attacks so far. The output sequence of
the ASG(r, s) is the XOR of its two irregularly decimated
generating sequences. Thus, he claims one could not expect
a strong correlation to be obtained efficiently, especially, if
the primitive feedback polynomials of high Hamming weight
are associated with the feedback functions of the generating
registers B and C [23]. Furthermore, the values of r and s are
considered as part of the secret key. Then, ASG(r, s) appears
to be secure against all correlation attacks introduced in [20],
[23]–[31].
Kanso also made the claim that ASG(r, s) is secure against
algebraic attacks [13] and the complexity of this attack is equal
to O((m3 +n3)Φ2l)1 where Φ = Φ1Φ2, Φ1 is the number of
possible values for r such that gcd(r, 2m−1) = 1 and Φ2 is the
number of possible values for s such that gcd(s, 2n− 1) = 1.
This attack takes approximately O((m3+n3)2m+n+l−2) steps
using the estimate Φ1 = 2m−1 and Φ2 = 2n−1. Therefore, the
ASG(r, s) appears to be secure against this attack.
IV. ASG MODEL FOR THE ASG(r, s)
Throughout the paper, we refer to the output sequence of
registers A, B and C by a = a0, a1, ..., at, b = b0, b1, ..., bi
and c = c0, c1, ..., cj respectively. Furthermore, we refer to
the output sequence of the ASG(r, s) by z = z0, z1, ..., zt. Let
Sa(t), Sb(t) and Sc(t) denote the internal states of registers
A, B and C at time t respectively, and let Sa(0), Sb(0) and
Sc(0) denote their initial states. As the finite state machine is
linear, the state transition can be described by a matrix which is
the companion matrix for an LFSR. We refer to the transition
matrix of registers B and C by Tb and Tc and we suppose that
1In [1], it is mentioned that this complexity is O(Φ2lm3n3) which is not
correct.
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Fig. 2. ASG model for the ASG(r, s)
the matrixes Tb and Tc are known in the rest of the paper. So,
we have:
Sb(t) = Sb(t− 1)Tb = Sb(0)T tb , (1)
Sc(t) = Sc(t− 1)Tc = Sc(0)T tc . (2)
Suppose that zt = bi ⊕ cj , so we have:
zt+1 = (bi+r ⊕ cj)at ⊕ (bi ⊕ cj+s)(at ⊕ 1). (3)
Suppose that the first output bits of registers B and C are
denoted by b0 and c0. It is clear that only the bits in positions
i = pr and j = qs are chosen from the regular output
sequence of registers B and C respectively and other bits are
discarded. In other words, the keystream output sequence (zt)
is constructed by a combination of two r-decimated and s-
decimated sequences derived from the regular output sequence
of B and C. We refer to these irregular sequences by β and λ
respectively. So, we have; β = β0, β1, ..., βt = b0, b1r, ..., btr,
such that βt = btr, for all t ≥ 0 and λ = λ0, λ1, ..., λt =
c0, c1s, ..., cts, such that λt = cts, for all t ≥ 0.
The constructor Kanso [1] recommended that each register
B and C should be an LFSR with output being an m-sequence.
According to the following well known theorem from [14],
both β and λ are m-sequences as well.
Theorem 1: Let b be a binary maximum-length sequence
(m-sequence) with periodicity (2m − 1). Let β be a sequence
obtained by sampling every rth bit of b, starting with the first
bit of b. Then β is again a m-sequence with the same period,
if and only if gcd(r, 2m − 1) = 1.
This means that we can model the clock-controlled LF-
SRs B and C, by new regular LFSRs, Br and Cs, with
transition matrixes Tβ and Tλ and regular output sequences
β = β0, β1, ..., βt and λ = λ0, λ1, ..., λt respectively. In other
words, the sequences β and λ can be regenerated by the same
length registers but different feedback polynomials. For their
internal states, we have:
Sβ(t) = Sβ(t− 1)Tβ = Sβ(0)T tβ , (4)
Sλ(t) = Sλ(t− 1)Tλ = Sλ(0)T tλ. (5)
If Eb and Ec denote the vectors which choose the last bit of
registers B and C’s internal states as an output bit, we can
write that:
βt = Sβ(t)Eb = Sβ(0)T
t
βEb, (6)
λt = Sλ(t)Ec = Sλ(0)T
t
λEc. (7)
Suppose that i = pr and j = qs, so we can rewrite (3) as
follow:
zt = bi ⊕ cj = βp ⊕ λq,
zt+1 = (βp+1 ⊕ λq)at ⊕ (βp ⊕ λq+1)(at ⊕ 1). (8)
It can be recognized easily that (8) describes an original ASG
whose output (zt) is composed of β and λ under the control
of at. So, we can model the ASG(r, s) to the original ASG
described in (8) which is illustrated in fig. 2. In the next
section, we will use this model and algebraic techniques to
attack the ASG(r, s).
Several attacks have been proposed on the original ASG in
the literature, but most of them do not affect the security of
the ASG(r, s). Our idea can be applied to the original ASG,
but it is not better than the previous attacks in contrast to the
ASG(r, s).
Table I shows the complexity of the previous attacks and
our attack on the original ASG. In table I, the first column
shows the name of the previous attacks against the original
ASG and the second column shows the Minimum Keystream
Length Requirement (MKLR). The third column shows the
total complexity and the last column shows the complexity of
the attack in the case when l = m = n = 64. In table I and
table II, L and M is equal to (l + m + n) and max {m,n}
respectively, and also we have Γ = 1− 1/(0.19m+ 3.1).
We can see easily from table I that the Johansson’s reduced
complexity attack [20] is the best existing attack on the
original ASG so far. For this reason, we briefly describe this
attack and try to apply it to the ASG(r, s). In the Johansson’s
reduced complexity attacks, the adversary waits for a segment
of M consecutive zeros (or ones) in the output sequence of
the ASG. If m ≤ n, then the adversary assumes that exactly
M/2 of them are from LFSR B. This is true with probability:(
M
M/2
)
2−M . (9)
The remaining (m − M/2) bits of LFSR B are found by
exhaustive search. The optimal complexity of this attack on
the original ASG is O(m222m/3).
This attack can not be applied to the ASG(r, s), because
its main assumption, that exactly M/2 bits of the M -bits
output segment comes from LFSR B’s initial state, is only true
when the output is composed of the two Stop/Go Generators’
output. But in case of ASG(r, s), the values of r and s can
be very large numbers. So, the main assumption to apply
the Johansson’s attack does not hold for the ASG(r, s) in
general. Therefore, we have to apply this attack to our ASG
model for the ASG(r, s), but it is not possible. Because the
Johansson’s attack needs to know the feedback polynomials of
the generator registers, Br and Cs, but they are unknown in our
ASG model. So, we have to search the r and s values to apply
this attack. We can search these values in Φ steps and apply
Johansson’s attack for each value of the r and s. The optimal
complexity of this attack is O(Φm222m/3) = O(m228m/3). In
the next section, our attack on the ASG(r, s) will be explained
and compared to this attack in table II.
TABLE I
THE COMPLEXITY OF PREVIOUS ATTACKS AGAINST THE ORIGINAL ASG
Attack MKLR Complexity l = m =
n = 64
Edit Distance
Correlation
[16]–[18]
O(m+ n) O((m+ n)2m+n) 2135
Clock Control
Guessing Attack
[22]
l +m+ n O(L32L/2) 2118.8
Algebraic Attack
[13] O(m+ n) O((m
3 + n3)2l) 283
Edit Probability
Correlation
Attack [19]
O(m+ n) O(M22M ) 276
Khazaei’s
Reduced
Complexity
Attack [21]
2m O(m22Γm) 271.8
Improved Edit
Distance
Correlation [32]
O(M) O(M2M ) 270
Linear
Consistency
Attack [15]
O(min(m,n)2l) 270
Johansson’s
Reduced
Complexity
Attacks [20]
O(22m/3) O(m222m/3) 254.7
Our Algebraic
Attack 3(m+ n) O((m
2 + n2)2l+1) 278
V. OUR ALGEBRAIC ATTACK ON THE ASG(r, s)
The goal of an attack on the stream cipher is to recover the
secret key or to predict and reproduce the rest of the keystream
to recover the rest of the cipher text. In [13] an algebraic
attack approach to a family of irregularly clock-controlled
LFSR based systems is presented. The complexity of this
attach on the original ASG structure is O((m3 + n3)2l). But,
its complexity on the ASG(r, s) is approximately O((m3 +
n3)2l+m+n−2). We make use of the same idea to attack the
ASG(r, s) but we have improved its complexity significantly.
If we XOR zt by zt+1 from (8), we have:
zt⊕zt+1=βp⊕λq⊕(βp+1⊕λq)at⊕(βp⊕λq+1)(1⊕at). (10)
Now, if we multiply both sides of (10) by at, we have:
(zt ⊕ zt+1)(at) = (βp ⊕ βp+1)(at), (11)
and if we multiply both sides of (10) by (1⊕ at), we obtain:
(zt ⊕ zt+1)(1⊕ at) = (λq ⊕ λq+1)(1⊕ at). (12)
From (11) and (12) we conclude that:
if at =
{
1 βp+1 = βp ⊕ zt ⊕ zt+1
0 λq+1 = λq ⊕ zt ⊕ zt+1
. (13)
So, if we know the value of at, βp and λq , we can find βp+1
and λq+1. Note that zt and zt+1 belong to the known output
sequence of the ASG(r, s).
In our attack, we search over all possible values for the
initial state of register A and produce the sequence a =
a0, a1, ..., at. Then, we guess the value of β0 and calculate
λ0 = z0⊕β0. Now, by (13) we can find the bits βp for p ≥ 1
and λq for q ≥ 1 as much as needed.
Using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm and 2m bits of β
and 2n bits of λ, we can find the feedback polynomials and
the initial states of the generator registers, Br and Cs, that
can directly produce the sequences β and λ regularly. Then,
by the rest of the output sequence we can test our guesses
for the value of β0 and the initial state of register A. As the
complexity of Berlekamp-Massey algorithm is O(n2) for a
sequence of length n, the complexity of this part of our attack
is equal to O((m2 + n2)2l+1).
Now, we have to find the value of parameters r and s and
the initial states of LFSR B, Sb(0), and C, Sc(0). We first
have to represent brt and bt by the Trace Function. The trace
function, Trm(x), is a mapping from the finite field GF (2m)
to GF (2) defined by
Trm(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
x2
i
.
Any m-sequence {bt} of period 2m − 1 with characteristic
polynomial which is the minimal polynomial of a primitive
element α (of order 2m−1) in GF (2m) can be represented by
the trace function as bt = Trm(uαt). Every nonzero element
u ∈ GF (2m) corresponds to a cyclic shift of {bt}. In our case
the situation is that we know Tb and have found Tβ and we
want to find r and s. To find r we know already α and brt
for {t = 0, 1, 2, ...} as well as the relations (14) and (15).
bt = Trm(uα
t), (14)
brt = Trm(uα
rt) = Trm(uγ
t), (15)
where (γ = αr). We want to find u which is part of the key
since it determines {bt}. First we guess a possible value for r
and compute γ = αr. Then we construct an equation system
by (15) for {t = 0, 1, 2, ...,m−1}. This is an equation system
in the m unknowns u, u2, ..., u2
m−1
. The system has full
rank due to the special form of the coefficient matrix and can
therefore be solved in complexity O(m3). If the solution of
equation system, u, can regenerate correctly the sequence brt
by using (15) for {t = m,m+1, ...} for sufficiently many bits,
our guess for r is correct. In other case, we have to repeat this
process with new possible value for r. Then u is found and
we can generate bt by using (14) for {t = 0, 1, 2, ...,m − 1}
which is the initial state of LFSR B. Similarly we can find
the initial state in the other LFSR C. The complexity of this
part is equal to O(Φ1m3 + Φ2n3) = O(m32m−1 + n32n−1).
Therefore, the total complexity of our attack is equal to:
C = O((m2 + n2)2l+1 +m32m−1 + n32n−1). (16)
Table II shows the complexity of the previous attacks and our
attack on the ASG(r, s) to compare their efficiencies. In case
of l = m = n = 64, the best previous attack needs 2153.5
steps to break the ASG(r, s), but our attack is significantly
better and it can find the secret key only by 282 steps. This
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF OUR ATTACK ON THE ASG(r, s) WITH OTHER KNOWN
ATTACKS
Attack MKLR Complexity l = m =
n = 64
Clock Control
Guessing Attack
[22]
l +m+ n O(L32
L+2m+2n−4
2 ) 2
566
Edit Distance
Correlation
[16]–[18]
O(m+ n)
O((m+
n)22(m+n)−2) 2
261
Algebraic Attack
[13] O(m+ n) O((m
3 +n3)2L−2) 2209
Edit Probability
Correlation
Attack [19]
O(m+ n) O(M22M+m+n−2) 2202
Improved Edit
Distance
Correlation [32]
O(M) O(M2M+m+n−2) 2196
Linear
Consistency
Attack [15]
O(min(m,n)23l−2) 2196
Khazaei’s
Reduced
Complexity
Attack [21]
2m O(m22(Γ+2)(m−2)) 2167.5
Johansson’s
Reduced
Complexity
Attacks [20]
O(22m/3) O(m22(8m/3)−2) 2153.5
Our Algebraic
Attack 3(m+ n)
O((m2+n2)2l+1+
m32m−1 + n32n−1) 2
82
difference comes from our idea to find the values of r and s.
In the previous attacks, the adversary has to guess the values
of r and s by exhaustive search, and for each guess, the attack
must be applied to the algorithm. But, in our idea, we do not
need to know the values of r and s to apply our attack and
we find these values independent of the exhaustive search over
the initial state of register A.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an ASG model for the ASG(r, s)
and also we present a new algebraic attack against the
ASG(r, s). The designer of the ASG(r, s) claims that this
structure is more secure than the original ASG, but we show
that its security is not more than the original ASG. Our attack
can find the secret key of ASG(r, s) by using of 3(m+n) bits
of the output keystream with O((m2 + n2)2l+1 +m32m−1 +
n32n−1) computational complexity.
As far as we know, there is no efficient attack against
the ASG(r, s) so far. The complexity of previous attacks is
much higher than the complexity of our attack. In case of
l = m = n = 64, the best previous attack needs 2153.5 steps
to break the ASG(r, s), but our attack can find the secret key
only by 282 steps. Our attack can be applied to the original
ASG structure. Its complexity is comparable to the best known
attacks but our attack does not need to know the characteristic
polynomial of generating registers. Applying our idea to other
clock-controlled structures is a subject for future research.
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